A multi-party contract signing (MPCS) protocol is used for a group of signers to sign a digital contract over a network. We analyse the protocols of Mukhamedov and Ryan (MR), and of Mauw, Radomirović and Torabi Dashti (MRT), using the finite-state model checker Mocha. Mocha allows for the specification of properties in alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) with game semantics, and the model checking problem for ATL requires the computation of winning strategies. This gives us an intuitive interpretation of the verification problem of crucial properties of MPCS protocols. We analyse the MR protocol with up to 5 signers and our analysis does not reveal any flaws. MRT protocols can be generated from minimal message sequences, depending on the number of signers. We discover an attack in a published MRT protocol with 3 signers, and present a solution for it. We also design a number of MRT protocols using minimal message sequences for 3 and 4 signers, all of which have been model checked in Mocha.
Introduction
The goal of a multi-party contract signing (MPCS) protocol is to allow a number of parties to sign a digital contract over a network. Such a protocol is designed as to ensure that no party is able to withhold his signature after having received another party's signature. A simple way to achieve this is to involve a trusted third party (T ). This trusted third party simply collects the signatures of all signers and then distributes them to all parties. A major drawback of this approach is that the trusted third party easily becomes a bottleneck, since it will be involved in all communications for all contracts. This problem is addressed by the introduction of, so-called, optimistic multi-party contract signing protocols [1] . The idea is that involvement of the trusted third party is only required if something goes wrong, e.g. if one of the parties tries to cheat or if a nonrecoverable network error occurs. If all parties and the communication network behave correctly, which is considered the optimistic case, the protocol terminates successfully without intervention of the trusted third party.
MPCS protocols are supposed to satisfy three properties: fairness, abusefreeness and timeliness. Fairness means that each signer who sends out his signature has a means to receive all the other signers' signatures. Abuse-freeness guarantees that no signer can prove to an outside observer that he is able to determine the result of the protocol. Timeliness ensures that each signer has the capability to end infinite waiting.
Several optimistic contract signing protocols have been proposed, most of which only focus on the special case of two parties [2, 3] . In 1999, Garay and Mackenzie proposed the first optimistic contract signing protocol [4] with multiple parties, which we call the GM protocol. Chadha, Kremer and Scedrov found a flaw in the GM protocol for n ≥ 4, where n is the number of signers. They revised the GM protocol by modifying one of its sub-protocols and proposed a fixed protocol [5] in 2004 (which we call the CKS protocol).
Mukhamedov and Ryan later showed that the CKS protocol fails to satisfy the fairness property for n ≥ 5 by giving a so-called abort-chaining attack. They proposed a fixed protocol [6] in 2008 based on the CKS protocol (which we call the MR protocol). Mukhamedov and Ryan proved that their protocol satisfies fairness and claimed that it satisfies abuse-freeness and timeliness as well. They also gave a formal analysis of fairness in the NuSMV model checker for 5 signers.
Using the notion of abort-chaining attacks, Mauw, Radomirović and Torabi Dashti analysed the message complexity of MPCS protocols [7] . Their results made it feasible to construct MPCS protocols excluding abort-chaining attacks but with minimal messages, which we call the MRT protocols, based on so-called signing sequences. They also gave an example protocol with 3 signers. However, they only provided a verification of the protocol at a conceptual level.
In this paper, we follow the approach of Chadha, Kremer and Scedrov [5] to model check the two recently proposed protocols, the MR and MRT protocols, in Mocha [8] . Mocha can be used to model check properties specified in ATL [9] . This allows us to have a precise and natural formulation of desired properties of contract signing, as the model checking problem for ATL requires the computation of winning strategies. We model the MR protocol with up to 5 signers and verify both fairness and timeliness properties, while Mukhamedov and Ryan only analysed fairness of their protocol with 5 signers.
We clarify how to construct an MRT protocol from a minimal signing sequence. According to this methodology, we design a number of MRT protocols for 3 and 4 signers, all of which have been model checked in Mocha. In particular, we discover a fairness attack on the published MRT protocol with 3 signers [7] and we present a solution to it. The fixed protocol is shown to satisfy fairness.
Preliminaries
This section describes the basic structure of an optimistic contract signing protocol with its underlying assumptions. A few cryptographic primitives are employed in such protocols which we only briefly introduce. We also explain the security requirements associated with MPCS protocols.
Basic Notions
An optimistic MPCS protocol generally involves a group of signers P 1 , . . . , P n , who want to sign a contract monitored by a trusted third party T . A signer
